NOTE
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1989
INTRODUCTION

During 1989, acts of judicial interpretation, administrative bureaucracy, and congressional inaction curtailed the ability of American citizens to gain access to government records under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). 1 The twenty-third year of the FOIA continued a trend toward increased restrictions of public access to government
information. 2 In 1989, the central battles over the trend toward decreased access concerned the definition of agency records, information
stored in computerized formats, and privacy rights under the FOIA.
The one victory for increased public access to government records
arose from the Supreme Court decision in Department of Justice v. Tax
Analyst&3 In this case, the Court considerably broadened the definition
of "agency records," including previously published documents within
the scope of the term.4 An agency can no longer argue that records publicly available elsewhere-created by other sources-are not "agency
records" under the FOIA. Thus, the decision in Tax Analysts allows
greater and more convenient access to state and local documents that are
stored in a single location as well as in the various states. A requester
can now obtain the required documents directly from a central location,
even though the records did not originate there.5
In a Supreme Court case construing privacy rights under the FOIA,
the scope of the Act was reduced dramatically. In Departmentof Justice
v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,6 the Court held that
"rap sheets" are categorically excluded under Exemption 7() of the
FOIA. 7 This categorical exemption allows agencies to decide that some
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2. See Note, Developments underthe Freedom ofInformation Act-1988, 1989 DuKE L.J. 687
[hereinafter Note, Developments--1988]. For a discussion of developments under the FOIA in prior
years, see the annual FOIA note in the Duke Law Journal from 1970-1988.
3. 109 S. Ct. 2841 (1989).

4. Id
5. See infra notes 25-55 and accompanying text.
6. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
7. See infra notes 56-84 and accompanying text.
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documents, such as rap sheets, are so private that they should never be
released-no matter how strong the public interest in favor of access. 8
Impliedly, other personal documents will be released only if the Court's
new, limited public interest test is satisfied. That test allows the release
of information only when the material requested relates to government
operations. 9 Reporters Committee substantially broadens an individual's
privacy interest under Exemption 7 and makes access to documents that
involve a privacy interest practically impossible.
Additionally, privacy interests were expanded under the FOTA in
several lower court cases. Two cases, National Association of Retired
FederalEmployees v. Homer10 and Albuquerque Publishing Co. v. Department of Justice,1 1 which deal with access to an individual's criminal
records and mailing lists of former federal employees, broadened the
holding in Reporters Committee by applying it to the privacy interest
protected under Exemption 6.12 Prior to Homer and Albuquerque Publishing, Exemption 6 had been considered to have a higher threshold
than Exemption 7. Thus, these new cases which equate the two different
standards could create substantial barriers to citizens who seek information about private individuals. Previously, access to items such as mailing lists was allowed where a strong public interest was present.
Currently, a requester is unlikely to prevail against an Exemption 6 or 7
defense by the government unless he can show that disclosure will reveal
how the government operates and only incidentally reveals personal data.
Further, these cases demonstrate the trend of the courts to broaden the
privacy exemptions of the FOIA-applying them to situations previously
not thought protected.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) issued guidelines based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Reporters Committee.1 3 Like the lower
courts, the DOJ read Reporters Committee broadly and urged agencies to
apply privacy interests to personal items other than rap sheets.1 4 These
guidelines, coupled with the lower court decisions, demonstrate the limited ability that agencies now possess to grant access to records that are
covered by one of the FOLA privacy exemptions.
8. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
9. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 752-53.
10. 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
11. 726 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1989). See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 87-109 and accompanying text.
13. DEPARTMENT OF JusTIcE, Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C): Step-by-Step Decslionmaking, FOIA UPDATE, Spring 1989, at 7 [hereinafter Step-by-Step Decisionmaking].
14. See infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court further limited access to agency records under
the FOIA in John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.' 5 The Court held that
the threshold language of Exemption 7, which required that documents
be "compiled" by the agency before they gain exempt status, referred
only to the collection of materials in a law enforcement file. 16 Consequently, a law enforcement agency could receive information from a nonlaw enforcement agency, file it with agency investigatory material, and
subsequently deny public access to that information.
In another important development, the D.C. Circuit in North v.
Walsh upheld the availability of the FOIA as an alternative to discovery
in criminal cases. 17 The court held that, despite the protests of the Office
of the Independent Counsel, North could use the FOIA when discovery
was not otherwise available.'
Another significant issue, dealt with by Congress and several administrative agencies, concerned proposals to alter the operation of the
FOLA in the area of computerized records. Part II of this Note deals
with the administrative developments in this area, and Part III concerns
the new congressional attitude toward electronic records. Currently, no
uniform guidelines exist to aid agencies in determining whether they
must respond to requests that require reprogramming of their existing
data. Also, it is not certain whether the public has access to information
contained in a computerized format. In two reports issued during 1989,
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that agencies
should respond to requests for computerized information in the same
way that they respond to requests for regular paper records. 19
In addition, in order to clarify the various existing policies regarding
these records, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) issued a study
to recommend how agencies and Congress should treat computer documents.2° The OTA urged Congress to fashion guidelines and policies for
agencies to follow in the area of electronic information.
Congress did consider a proposal introduced by Representative
Kleczka concerning electronic information under the FOIA. 2 1 This bill
would have statutorily defined "agency records" to include computerized
15. 110 S. Ct. 471 (1989).
16. See infra notes 113-39 and accompanying text.

17. 881 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
18. See infra notes 149-64 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 186-217 and accompanying text; see also OMB Issues ProposedPolicy on
Electronic Information, 15 AccESs Rep. (Monitor Pub. Co.) No. 1, at 6 (Jan. 11, 1989).
20. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMING THE NATION: FEDERAL INFORMA-

TION DSSMINATION IN AN ELErCRONiC AGE 207-36 (1988) [hereinafter INFORMING THE
NATION].
21. H.R. 2773, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E2352-06 (1989).
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materials as well as regular paper formats in order to ensure that most
government records would be publicly available. 2 However, the bill
died in subcommittee.
In response to the savings and loan crisis, Congress debated a proposal to amend Exemption 8 of the FOIA to make financial information
more readily available to the public. 23 The bill would have allowed a
requester to receive financial information and background materials
about failed banks and savings and loans. 24 Congress hoped that increased access to this information would prevent another crisis in the
future by alerting people to the financial status of their banks. However,
this bill also failed to pass.
I.

JuDicIAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Supreme Court Ruling on Publicly Available Records: Defining
Agency Records
Although the FOIA's mandatory disclosure provisions require that
"agency records" be made available to any person upon request, the term
"agency records" is not defined within the Act. 25 This lack of a definition has left unclear the specific nature of the information included
within the scope of the Act.26 Thus, what constitutes an "agency record" is a recurrent theme in FOIA litigation. 27 Recently, the question of
22. See infra notes 241-54 and accompanying text.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1278, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1105 (1989); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)
(1988). See infra notes 218-40 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 220-40 and accompanying text.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1988). Section 552(a)(2) discusses items that agencies must make
available upon request, but does not specifically define the term "agency records."
Not only is the term "agency record" not defined within the FOLA, but the legislative history
"yields insignificant insight into Congress' conception of the sorts of materials the Act covers."
McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1106, modified in other respects 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
For a further discussion of the problem in defining the term "agency record," see Note, The Definilion of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of InformationAct, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1093 n.2
(1979) (noting that the confusion over the definition of agency records is complicated by the Act's
mention of "matters," "memorandums [sic] or letters," and "files").
26. See 1 K. DAvIS, ADM nnrATIvE LAW TREATIS, § 5:4 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing the
impacts of the changes in the definition of "agency records" over the last 20 years); Note, A Control
Testfor Determining "Agency Record" Status Under the Freedom ofInformationAct, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 611, 616 (1985) (examining whether records that are created by a non-FOTA agency become
classified as "agency records" in some instances and thus are subject to the FOIA).
27. See, eg., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980)
(documents did not acquire status of "agency records" when they were transferred from a nonFOLA agency, the Office of the President, to a FOIA agency); Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 186
(1980) (fact that study was financially supported by a FOIA agency did not transform the source
material into an "agency record"); Thurner Heat Treating Corp. v. NLRB, 839 F.2d 1256, 1259 (7th
Cir. 1988) (holding that affidavits of witness-employees of government employer were "agency
records").
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what constitutes an "agency record" has become increasingly important
due to the number of computerized records that are stored in a central
location.28 In Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts,29 the Supreme
Court ruled that records that were available to the public through
sources other than the agency were still subject to disclosure under the
FOIA. The agency thus had a duty to produce the records. This ruling
greatly increased public access to the records of nonprofit organizations
that seek to use government information to advance the interests of their
30
organization.
In Tax Analysts, the Tax Analysts, publishers of a nonprofit tax
magazine, had filed a FOIA suit to gain weekly access to DOJ case fies
that contained federal district court tax opinions.3 1 The DOJ resisted
disclosure of these files on two grounds: first, the files were not the
DOJ's records, 32 and second, they were already available through the
district courts that had issued the opinions.3 3 The Tax Analysts, however, argued that these opinions were unpublished and not immediately
available. In response to the DOJ argument that the information was
available from the district courts, Tax Analysts argued that the records
were difficult to locate in the various district courts around the country.
The Tax Analysts sought to increase its efficiency and economy by gaining access to the DOJ's files, which contained all of these tax opinions in
one central location. 34
The Court held that the DOJ must make its fies ofjudicial tax opinions available to the tax reporting service. 35 In so holding, the Court
28. See Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1986, 1987 DUKE L.J.
521, 543-46 [hereinafter Note, Developments-1986];Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1984, 1985 DuKE L.J. 742, 774-82 (discussion of litigation occurring in 1984 over
definition of "agency record"); Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1983,
1984 DuKE L.J. 377, 393-402 (discussion of litigation occurring in 1983 concerning definition of
"agency record").
29. 109 S.Ct. 2841 (1989).
30. For a further discussion concerning the impact of Tax Analysts, see Note, Developments-

1988, supra note 2, at 704-10.
31. 109 S.Ct. at 2844.
32. Id.The DOJ argued that the FOIA was not triggered by mere control or agency possession, but in fact required compilation by the agency.
33. Id The FOIA confers jurisdiction on the district courts "to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988). Under this provision, "federal jurisdiction is dependent on a showing
that an agency has (1) 'improperly'; (2) 'withheld'; (3) 'agency records."' Kissinger v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980). Unless each of these criteria is met, a
district court lacks jurisdiction to devise remedies to force an agency to comply with FOIA's disclosure requirements. Id
34. Tax Analysts v. Department of Justice, 643 F. Supp. 740, 743 (D.D.C. 1986).
35. Tax Analysts, 109 S.Ct. at 2845. The Supreme Court upheld the D.C. Circuit, overruling
the summary judgment granted the DOJ by the lower court. The district court had reasoned that
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affirmed the lower court's finding that the tax opinions were agency
records and that the DOJ had improperly withheld those records when it
36
refused to provide them to the Tax Analysts.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found the arguments by the
DOJ insufficient to defeat the operation of the FOIA's basic disclosure
requirements of matters contained in agency records.37 To arrive at this
conclusion, Justice Marshall first considered whether the tax opinions
were agency records. Relying on two recent Supreme Court decisions,
Kissingerv. Reporters Committeefor Freedom of the Press38 and Forsham
v. Harris39 the Court noted two essential prerequisites that must be satisfied for requested materials to become an agency record: first, the agency
must "either create or obtain" a record, and second, the agency must be
in control of the requested materials at the time of the FOIA request. 40
Marshall applied this two-part test and found that the DOJ case files
satisfied the first prong-the agency had obtained the records. 4 1 He
noted that it does not matter that the courts are not an "agency" under
the FOIA, because it makes no difference "whether the organization
from which the documents originated is itself covered by the FOIA." 4 2
In addition, the Court found that the second part of the test was satisfied
because the DOJ exercised control over the records. 43 The Court defined
"control" over the records to mean that "the materials have come into
44
the agency's possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties."
A contrary ruling would have confined the definition of "agency records"
beciuse the records already were a matter of public record, the requested material was not "improperly withheld" as required by 5 U.S.C. § 551(a)(4)(B) (1988). Tax Analysms 643 F. Supp. at 74345.
36. See Tax Analysts v. Department of Justice, 845 F.2d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
37. See Tax Analysts 109 S. Ct. at 2847.
38. 445 U.S. 136, 157 (1980) (noting that the records involved were not in the control of or
generated by the agency, the Court held that the fact that records are physically located at a certain
agency does not necessarily render them records of that agency).
39. 445 U.S. 169, 186 (1980) (the FOIA applies to records that have in fact been obtained and
not to records that merely could have been obtained).
40. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. at 2847-48.
41. Id at 2848.

42. Id See Comment, What is a Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom ofInformationAct's
Threshold Requirements, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 408 (discussing how agencies routinely use studies,
trade reports, and other materials produced outside the agency and how these often were considered
agency records).
43. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. at 2848. The Court, in explaining the control requirement, stated,

"[t]he control inquiry focuses on an agency's possession of the requested materials, not on its power
to alter the content of the materials it receives.... An authorship-control requirement thus would
sharply limit 'agency records' essentially to documents generated by the agencies themselves." Id at
2849.
44. Id at 2848. "To restrict the term 'agency records' to material generated internally would
frustrate Congress' desire to put within public reach the information available to an agency in its
decision-making processes." Id at 2847.
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to materials created by the agency.4 5 Marshall stated that this result
"would be incompatible with the FOLA's goal of giving the public access
to all non-exempted information received by an agency as it carries out

its mandate." 4
Marshall also rejected the DOJ's argument that denial of access was

legitimate under section 552(a)(3) 47 of the Act, which provides that agencies need not release records that are either promptly published and of48
fered for sale or made available under section 552(a)(1) or (a)(2).
Marshall explained that the disclosure limitations set out in these subsections only apply to situations in which the requested materials previously

have been published or made available by the.agency itself.49
The Court's holding will increase citizen access to information-the
primary goal of the FOIA. Because the definition of "agency record" is
central to the operation of the FOIA, the scope of the definition determines whether the FOTA applies to a particular request. Thus, the Court
correctly interpreted the term in light of the policies behind the Act.
Congress enacted the FOIA out of a belief that the public has a right to
government information and that public access to such information is
essential if the government is to be held accountable to the electorate.5 0
Justice Marshall defined "agency records" in a broad fashion to include
information that had not been created by the agency. Through this defi45. See id at 2848.
46. Id. at 2849. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 772 (1989) (stating that Congress, in enacting the FOIA, sought "to open agency action to
the light of public scrutiny") (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 452 U.S. 352, 372

(1976)).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(aX3) (1988). Section 552(a)(3) provides that:
Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such
records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if
any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any
person.
48. Tax Analysts; 109 S.CL at 2851. The Court noted that, "subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are
carefully limited to situations in which the requested materials have been previously published or
made available by the agency itself." Id at 2852. Section 552(a)(1) requires agencies to publish in
the FederalRegister descriptions of its methods of operation, rules of procedures, general policies
and substantive rules, as well as any amendments to the above items. Section 552(a)(2) requires
agencies, in addition to the mandates of section 552(a)(1), to make available its interpretations, final
opinions, policy statements and staff manuals to the public for inspection and copying.
49. Tax Analysts, 109 S.CL at 2852. Justice Marshall explained that,
Congress undoubtedly was aware of the redundancies that might exist when requested
materials have been previously made available. It chose to deal with that problem by crafting only narrow categories of materials which need not be, in effect, disclosed twice by the
agency. If Congress had wished to codify an exemption for all publicly available materials,
it knew perfectly well how to do so.

Id
50. See 1 B. BRAVERMAN & F. CHETwYND, INFORMATION LAW: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, PRIVACY, OPEN MEETINGS, OTmR ACCESS LAws § 1-1.3 (1985).
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nition, Marshall upheld the basic purpose of the FOIA-to allow the
greatest possible public access to government information.
Justice Blackmun, the lone dissenter, characterized the Tax Analysts' request as "almost a gross misuse of the FOIA. 51 According to
Justice Blackmun, Congress could not have intended this result because
the materials already were available elsewhere.52 Because these materials
could be obtained through the individual district courts, Justice Blackmun argued that the Tax Analysts' demands added "nothing whatsoever
to public knowledge of government operations." He stated that "[t]he
result of its now-successful effort in this litigation is to impose the cost of
obtaining the court orders and opinions upon the Government and thus
'53
upon taxpayers generally."
Blackmun's dissent focused solely on the issue of who should bear
the cost of producing the agency records. He saw no harm in foisting the
burden and cost for requesting and locating these cases onto the Tax
Analysts. Although the cost of producing records is an important concern, Congress did not intend this factor to be an important consideration in determining whether a citizen should have access to government
information. 54 If Congress felt that the cost of record production was too
great, then it would have added increased user fees to the Act. Yet, Congress continually has cut back on user fees, especially those charged to
public interest groups. 55 Until Congress decides that application of the
FOIA is too expensive, the Courts should not introduce a cost-based
analysis into the FOIA. The Court should instead interpret the FOIA
51. Tax Analysts 109 S.Ct. at 2854.
52. Id at 2853-54.
53. Id at 2854. Justice Blackmun observed that although Tax Analysts was a nonprofit organization for federal income tax purposes, it was still a "commercial enterprise." He argued that the
result of the litigation had been to shift business costs for obtaining court orders on opinions to the
public. Id
54. The original fee provision of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982), provided that fees
shall be limited to reasonably standard charges for document search and duplication and provide for
recovery of only the direct costs of such search and duplication. Documents shall be furnished
without charge or at a reduced charge where the agency determines that waiver or reduction is in the
public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public. Under this version, all requesters pay search and duplication costs. In 1986 Congress
amended the FOIA fee provisions in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1803, 150
Stat. 3207-47 to 3207-50 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1988)). Under the new law, the news
media and educational and scientific institutions seeking information for scholarly or scientific research will pay only duplication costs. Committee Requesters will pay only for review time, and
those not falling within either of these two categories will continue to pay the previous fees for search
and duplication. The law changed "so that more of the costs of the FOIA will be recouped, and at
the same time [to] relieve the news media of the need to pay a high cost for access to government
records." 132 CONG. Rac. S14,033 (1986) (Statement of Senator Leahy).
55. See Note, Developments-1986,supra note 28, at 529-34 (discussing lower fee structure for
news media and scientific educational institutions).
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broadly to fulfill the congressional intent of guaranteeing public access to
information. By expanding the definition of agency records to include
DOJ files of judicial tax opinions, the Court in Tax Analysts effectuated
the FOTA's purpose.
B.

Reporters Committee: BalancingPersonalPrvacy and the Public
Interest in Disclosure Under Exemption 7(C)

In an opinion that has had a dramatic impact on the public's access
to records with regard to private citizens, the Supreme Court, in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committeefor Freedom of the Press,5 6 broadened Exemption 7(C). Exemption 7(C) excludes from disclosure records
compiled for law enforcement purposes "but only to the extent that the
production of such [materials] ... could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. '5 7 Prior to Reporters Committee, Exemption 7(C) required that a reviewing court balance
the extent and seriousness of the invasion of privacy against the public
interest in disclosure of the information.58 Unless the balance tipped in
favor of privacy, the FOIA required that the agency disclose the information. This balancing approach required an inquiry into the purposes for
which the information was being sought-in order to weigh that purpose
against the privacy interest and determine whether disclosure was warranted.5 9 In Reporters Committee, the Court unanimously declared that
rap sheets did not require this balancing of interests, simply concluding
that rap sheets were categorically excluded under Exemption 7(C).
Reporters Committee involved a FOIA request by journalists who
sought access to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) rap sheets, which
had been collected from state and local governments. After the FBI denied the FOIA requests, the respondents filed suit in the district court
56. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988).
58. See Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (access to FBI
reports concerning the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. denied as the privacy interest
involved outweighed the public interest in disclosure); Congressional News Syndicate v. Department
of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D.D.C. 1977) (after balancing, court decided that exemption does
not apply to ledger sheets documenting illegal political contributions that later become part of a

criminal investigative file).
59. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (court evaluated and weighed
the particular purpose for which the requester sought the information).
60. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780. In Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press v.
Department of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 732 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Reporters Comm. 11, the
court defined "rap sheets" as "FBI records on individuals whose fingerprints have been submitted to
the FBI in connection with arrests and, in certain instances, employment, naturalization and military service.... A rap sheet typically contains information concerning an individual's arrests, indictments, convictions and imprisonments, and a notation of the source of the information."

(citation omitted).
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seeking the rap sheet of Charles Medico. 6 1 Medico, a defense contractor,
allegedly was connected to organized crime and had obtained a number
of defense contracts through an improper arrangement with an allegedly
corrupt congressman. Respondents asserted that a record of financial
crimes by Medico would be a matter of public interest and that Medico's
privacy interest in his criminal records was minimal because the criminal
process is public. Petitioner, the DOJ, refused to confirm whether it had
information concerning nonfinancial crimes. 62
The district court granted summary judgment for the DOJ and held
that the rap sheet was protected by Exemption 7(C) of the FOIA. 63 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the primary factor to consider
when evaluating the public interest in disclosure was whether a state or
local entity had decided to make the records part of the public record. 64
Noting the absence of statutory standards by which to determine the
public interest in disclosure, the court of appeals concluded that it should
be bound by state and local determinations that such information should
65
be made available to the general public.
In response to rehearing petitions advising the court that, contrary
to its original understanding, most states had adopted policies of refusing
to provide members of the public with criminal history summaries, the
court modified its rationale. 66 After denying the rehearing, the D.C. Circuit's second opinion affirmed its original decision and instructed the district courts to limit themselves in this type of case to a factual inquiry
concerning whether the subject's legitimate privacy interest in his rap
sheet was outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. 67 Concluding
that the disparity among the various local statutes did not allow the
courts to arrive at a measure of the public interest in this material, the
court stated that it was not within the capacity of the judiciary to determine the public interest in this information. 68 Therefore, the court of
61. Reporters Comm. I, 816 F.2d at 732.
62. Id at 732, 740.
63. Id at 737-38.
64. Id. at 741 (court argued that district court had incorrectly based its evaluation of the public
interest on the fact that the records involved minor offense that occurred long ago).

65. Id
66. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Department of Justice, 831 F.2d 1124 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Reporters Comm. I1]. For a thorough discussion of Reporters Comm I and
Reporters Comm. II, see Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1987, 1988

DuKE LJ. 600-08.
67. Reporters Comm. I, 831 F.2d at 1127.
68. Id. at 1126 (court modified its rationale because conflicts between state and local policies on
disclosure of rap sheets made it impossible simply to defer to those entities' judgments as to which
records should be publicly available). The court was concerned that the term "public interest" was
not defined by the FOIA and further that the FOIA provided no way to measure the public interest
in disclosure. The court decided that the disclosure of information under Exemption 7(C) should
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appeals directed the district court to determine whether the DOJ held
information that would have to be disclosed pursuant to the balancing
test outlined in this holding. 69
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the D. C. Circuit and ruled
that rap sheets in the FBI's computerized database of criminal history
information were protected by Exemption 7(C).7 ° Writing for the Court,
Justice Stevens made it clear that under no circumstances would the privacy interests of individuals be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of rap sheets; therefore, access would be absolutely denied. 71
The Supreme Court examined the FOIA's legislative history and observed that the framers of the Act did not intend the disclosure of
records with regard to private citizens. 72 Justice Stevens found that the
statutory language mandated that a court balance the public interest in
disclosure against the interest Congress intended the exemption to protect. In resolving how to apply this balancing test, Justice Stevens dispensed with traditional case-by-case balancing of interests and instead
adopted a categorical approach. 73 By taking this approach, the Court
severely limited the weight accorded to the public interest in access to
this kind of information. 74
not hinge upon a federal court's appraisal of the public's need to know particular information. See
id at 1126-27. The court even rejected the claim that disclosure that would inform the citizens
about government corruption should somehow be favored. The court ruled that if a "core purpose"
of the FOIA existed, it would not "confer judicial power to predict whether particular information
...will ...aid an 'informed citizenry' as to democratic political choices." Id at 1125. Cf id at
1129 (Starr, J.,dissenting). Starr argued that while the judiciary was not well-equipped to make
value judgments concerning what was in the public interest, Congress' decision that the judiciary
conduct a de novo review of these issues mandated that the court fulfil its duty. Starr noted that
"the public interest in any particular case can vary beyond the 'general disclosure policies on the
statute' ... and is to be seriously weighed against the subject's privacy interest" (quoting iadat

1125).
69. Ideat 1127.
70. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989).
71. See id. Stevens stated, "[W]e hold as a categorical matter that a third party's request for
law-enforcement records or information about a private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade
that citizen's privacy, and that when the request seeks no 'official information' about a Government
agency, but merely records that the Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is
'unwarranted." Id
72. See id at 765. ("The authority to delete identifying details [from a requested record] ... is
necessary in order to be able to balance the public's right to know with the private citizen's right to
be secure in his personal affairs which have no bearing or effect on the general public." Id at 766
n.18 (citing S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965)).
73. See id at 771.
74. See id at 772. Stevens stated:
[W]hether disclosure of a private document under Exemption 7(C) is warranted must turn
on the nature of the requested document and its relationship to "the basic purpose of the
Freedom of Information Act 'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.'"...
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Justice Stevens considered various factors that might warrant this
type of invasion of personal privacy, and placed the burden on the requester to demonstrate that the invasion would be justified. Observing
that all requesters had identical rights of access under the FOIA, 75 Justice Stevens noted that an authorized disclosure must be based on both
the nature of the requested document and its relationship to the basic
purpose of the FOIA-i.e., to provide access to information that reveals
how the government operates. 76 This approach ignored the traditional
method of analysis, which limited the examination to the particular pur77
pose for which the document was requested.
Indicating that the major purpose of the FOIA is "to open agency
action to the light of public scrutiny," Justice Stevens argued that requests for information that provided insight into an agency's performance of its statutory duties were examples of requests that would fall
squarely within the FOIA's purpose. 78 The Court asserted that information about private citizens contained in governmental files revealed little
about the operation and activities of an agency. 79 Justice Stevens argued
that in most requests for information about private citizens, "the requester does not intend to discover anything about the conduct of the
agency that has possession of the requested record."'8 0 Thus, the Court
held such requests were not central to the FOIA and they could be relegated to a less rigorous, categorical form of balancing.
In a separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
Brennan, disagreed with the Court's use of categorical balancing under
Exemption 7(C).1 They argued that Exemption 7(C)'s language and legislative history did not sustain the majority's exclusion of all rap sheet
material from the FOIA disclosure requirements. 2 Using rap sheet information as an example of the information that should be brought to the
public's attention, they proposed a situation in which a rap sheet disclosed a congressional candidate's conviction of tax fraud five years
That purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens
...that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct.

Id (citations omitted).
75. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988) (grants equal access to information by any person).

76. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772-73.
77. But see Julian v. Department of Justice, 806 F.2d 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affid, 486 U.S. I

(1988); Note, Developments-1988, supra note 2, at 686.
78. Reporters Comm, 489 U.S. at 772 (citing Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,

372 (1976)).
79. Id at 773.
80. Id
81. Id at 780-81 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
82. Id
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before.83 Blackmun explained, "Surely, the FBI's disclosure of that information could not 'reasonably be expected' to constitute an invasion of
personal privacy, much less an unwarranted invasion, inasmuch as the
candidate relinquished any interest in preventing the dissemination of the
information when he chose to run for Congress."' ' Because of the need
for public access to rap sheet information in certain circumstances, Justices Blackmun and Brennan concluded that a bright line test was not
appropriate for Exemption 7(C) determinations. The concurrence argued for a return to the traditional case-by-case approach that allowed a
flexible balancing of the public and private interest.8 5
The Reporters Committee standard substantially broadened the protection of personal privacy interests under the FOIA. This expanded
protection, however, is both bad policy and an unwarranted interpretation of the FOIA. Although the Supreme Court's decision protects individual privacy, its narrow interpretation of the public interest fails to
ensure that the FOIA will continue to serve its main purpose of providing free and open access to government-held information. Moreover, the
new public interest standard does not account for the many beneficial
uses to which some members of the public might put the information.
The Court applied a narrow definition of the public interest because
of the dangers it perceived in reading the FOTA as a universal right to
access. Further, the Court shifted to a categorical approach when dealing with documents such as rap sheets. After Reporters Committee, the
Court no longer will evaluate each requester individually, but instead will
apply a single standard for evaluating all requests under Exemption 7(C).
Therefore, when determining whether to grant a request for information,
the Court will consider only the benefits of learning more about government agencies and balance this against the invasion of privacy that might
occur if some members of the public received the information. By using
such an analysis, the Court's answer was preordained to promote the
protection of privacy over access to information, and thus, to-subvert the
congressional intent behind the enactment of the FOIA.
1. Lower CourtInterpretationsof Reporters Committee. Two recent cases decided shortly after Reporters Committee further demonstrate the new importance given to the protection of privacy under the
FOIA.8 6 These cases reflect the significance of the Supreme Court's rul83. It
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Albuquerque Publishing Co. v. Department of Justice, 726 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1989).
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ing in Reporters Committee. The decision completely altered the standards by which invasions of privacy are determined. The Reporters
Committee test requires a court to balance an individual's privacy against
the abstract public interest in access to materials about the operation of
the government. Thus far this test has proved impossible to meet. In

both cases, those seeking access to information on former criminal investigations and on mailing lists of federal employees found Exemption 7(C)
and Exemption 6 to be overwhelming obstacles.
In the first appellate interpretation of Reporters Committee, a panel
of the D.C. Circuit, in NationalAssociation of Retired FederalEmployees
v. Homer, ruled that a mailing fist of recently retired or disabled federal
employees is protected information under Exemption 6.87 The district
court had ruled that the list was not covered by Exemption 6 because any
privacy interest in such information was minor.8 In reversing, the D. C.
Circuit expanded the Supreme Court's holding in Reporters Committee
by applying it to Exemption 689 in addition to Exemption 7.9°
87. 879 F.2d at 879. This case arose because of a change in policy at the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). Between 1979 and 1981, the OPM had assisted the National Association of
Retired Federal Employees (NARFE) in recruiting new members by providing lists of newly retired
federal employees. OPM stopped assisting the NARFE in 1982 and subsequently NARFEs membership began to decline. Using the FOIA, NARFE requested a list of names and addresses of
retired employees.
88. National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 633 F. Supp. 1241 (D.D.C. 1988).
The district court stated,
[TI]his circuit has recognized only a slight interest in a person's name and address, and has
discounted, if not ignored altogether, the possible secondary effects that the release of such
information might have on the addressee. Unless the release of names and addresses,
standing alone, will embarrass the individuals involved, this circuit has determined that the
information is entitled to little protection.
Id. at 1244.
89. See NationalAss'n, 879 F.2d at 873. Exemption 6 provides that an agency shall not disclose
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX6) (1988).
90. SeeNationalAss'n, 879 F.2d at 883. The Supreme Court did not rule on the use of Exemption 6 in the Reporters Committee decision. 489 U.S. 749, 755-56 (1989). However, in the past,
Exemption 6, which requires a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy, was viewed by the courts
as having a higher threshold than Exemption 7(C). See Bast v. FBI, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (lower standard for disclosure under Exemption 7(C) recognized by courts because of increased shame associated with release of law enforcement records in comparison to medical and
personnel records covered by Exemption 6); see also I B. BRAVERMAN & F. CHETWYND, supra note
50, § 11-17 (discussing disclosures under Exemption 7(e) that would be considered unwarranted
invasions of personal privacy). 'See generally Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of
Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In FederalLabor RelationsAuthority, the D.C. Circuit
reinforced the view that the Reporters Committee's standard applied to Exemption 6. The case involved a request by unions for a list of names and addresses of employees represented by the unions.
The court, relying on Reporters Committee barred disclosure of the names since the release would
not inform the public about government actions. The court stated that even though this information
promoted the public interest by facilitating federal sector collective bargaining, this was not the
public interest the FOIA was enacted to promote.
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Writing for the panel, Judge Douglas Ginsburg noted that, based
upon the recent Supreme Court decision in Reporters Committee, the
court must reverse the judgment of the district court.9 1 Ginsburg found
that the release of the list would constitute a significant invasion of privacy because this particular list not only revealed the names and addresses of hundreds of thousands of individuals, but also indicated
whether each was retired or disabled and whether they received a
monthly annuity check from the federal government. 92 After deciding
that privacy issues were involved, Ginsburg examined the extent of the
invasion of privacy that would occur if the mailing lists were revealed to
any requester and balanced this concern against the public interest in
disclosure. 93 Ginsburg noted that the disclosure would not be limited to
just the plaintiff in this case, but that other businesses, charities, and
fund-raising organizations "could get from the Government, at nominal
cost, a list of prime sales prospects to soicit.... and.., could ...
subject the listed annuitants 'to an unwanted barrage of mailings and
personal solicitations.' "94 Therefore, Judge Ginsburg found that the release of the list would create the possibility of a privacy infringement.
Judge Ginsburg next considered the public interest in the disclosure
of these mailing lists. 95 Relying on Reporters Committee, Ginsburg dismissed any substantial public interest in release of the lists. He noted
that the only public interest that the National Association of Retired
Federal Employees had put forth was that the "disclosure of annuitants'
names and addresses would aid [it] in its lobbying activities, and thus
result in the passage of laws that would benefit the public in general and
federal retirees in particular. ' 96 After the decision in Reporters Committee, Judge Ginsburg observed that these lobbying efforts were not relevant to the public interest; this type of information revealed nothing
about government operation. He asserted that "unless the public would
learn something directly about the workings of the Government by
knowing the names and addresses of its annuitants, their disclosure is not
affected with the public interest. '97 Because the release of these lists
91. NationalAss'n, 879 F.2d at 874.
92. Id

93. Id at 875. The court stated that because the FOIA requires non-exempt files to be disclosed to "any person" under 5 U.S.C. § 552(aX3) (1988), the information considered for disclosure
must balance the privacy rights against the impact that general disclosure to the world would have.
The court would not consider the result of disclosure to the particular requester involved.
94. NationalAss'n, 879 F.2d at 876 (quoting Minnis v. Department of Agriculture, 737 F.2d

784, 787 (9th Cir. 1984)).
95. Id at 878.

96. Id at 879.
97. Id
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failed to add to the public's knowledge about government operations,
Judge Ginsburg refused to release the lists.9 8
Judge Ginsburg greatly expanded the Supreme Court's holding in
Reporters Committee. The Supreme Court had declined to rule on the
correct application of Exemption 6 in that case, 99 but Ginsburg ignored
the Court's limited holding and applied the Exemption 7 rationale to this
Exemption 6 case. Ginsburg bypassed the statutory language that requires the government to meet a more stringent test before it can withhold information under Exemption 6. The test for Exemption 7 only
requires that the government show an "unwarranted invasion of privacy."10 0 Under Exemption 6, the government must show that a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"10 1 occurs. By ignoring this
specific statutory language and by incorrectly equating these two tests,
Ginsburg went far beyond the Supreme Court's holding in Reporters
Committee.
The legislative history concerning the ude of the language "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" reveals a carefully considered
congressional policy that favors disclosure. Evidence of congressional intent to draw a distinction between the Exemption 6 standard and that of
Exemption 7 derives from Congress' refusal to delete this language that it
considered critical to limit the scope of the exemption. Indeed, Congress
kept the language over the objections of several spokespersons who
wanted it stricken.' 0 2 Ginsburg overlooked not only the statutory language, but also the legislative history when he held that the Reporters
Committee rationale should be applied to the Exemption 6 situation.
Ginsburg's decision in NationalAssociation effectively amended Exemption 6-a prerogative of Congress, not the courts.
Ginsburg should have held that the Reporters Committee standard
did not apply to the instant case and construed Exemption 6 narrowlyconsistent with the intent of Congress-which would have given effect to
the FOIA's purpose of favoring disclosure. In the future, Congress may
decide that an added exemption may be necessary to prevent exploitation
of the FOIA as a source of business information for private commercial
interest. Until that occurs, however, it is not within a court's province to
98. Id
99. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755-56
(1989).

100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988).
101. Id at § 552(b)6) (emphasis added).
102. See Hearingson HR. S012 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operationsof
the House ofRepresentative&89th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1965) (Sup. Doe. No. y4.G-74/7: R24/3)
(testimony of Fred B. Smith, acting General Counsel, Treasury Department); id at 257 (testimony
of William Feldesman, National Labor Relations Board solicitor).
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expand exemptions in order to narrow the statute and thereby subvert
the public's congressionally created right to information.
In the second lower court case to interpret Reporters Committee,
D.C. District Court Judge John H. Pratt ruled in Albuquerque Publishing
Co. v. Departmentof Justice that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
properly withheld records concerning its surveillance and investigation
of an Albuquerque nightclub owner, Ken Gattas.10 3 The DEA had investigated Gattas for suspected arson and drug trafficking. The records
were sought by an investigative reporter for the Albuquerque Tribune
The reporter claimed that she was requesting the information to learn
more about the arson charges and the amount of drug trafficking that
had occurred at the club.1 04 The DEA argued that the requested documents contained material that concerned third parties who were associated with the surveillance of Gattas and that disclosure of this
10 5
information would be an invasion of privacy.
Relying on Reporters Committee, Judge Pratt found that much of
the requested information was protected by Exemption 7(C).106 Pratt
observed that the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee had emphasized that the FOIA's main purpose was "to open agency action to the
light of public scrutiny." 10 7 Yet the plaintiff, by her own admission,
sought the DEA's records on Gattas to learn" 'the complete truth about
the fire . . . and the extent of drug trafficking at the night club.' "108
Because the court found that the plaintiff's principal interest was to acquire information from the DEA about Gattas and his cohorts and not to
inquire into the DEA's conduct in the investigation, Judge Pratt refused
to release the information. 109
2. Implicationsof CourtRulings After Reporters Committee. Because the D.C. Circuit is the leading circuit for interpreting the FOIA
law, its decisions provide an important indication of how subsequent
courts will apply Reporters Committee. Based on the outcome of NationalAssociation andAlbuquerque PublishersCo., it is clear that the balancing test used to weigh whether disclosures are appropriate has moved
103. 726 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1989).
104. Id. at 855. Because Gattas had pleaded guilty during the trial, not all of the evidence

against him had been presented. Id at 853.
105. Id at 855.
106. Id at 856. The court reasoned that, "Reporters Committee and decisions in this Circuit
indicate that individuals have a substantial privacy interest in information that either confirms or
suggests that they may have been subject to a criminal investigation." Id at 855 (citation omitted).
107. Id at 856 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)).
108. Id at 855 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff at 2-3 (No. 87-2590)).
109. Id at 860-61. The court granted summary judgment to the DEA on its Exemption 7(C)
claim.

1130

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1990:1113

so far toward personal privacy that, in effect, the value assigned to public
disclosure has become almost non-existent. These recent decisions suggest that the determining factor has become the possibility of misuse of
the information by a general requester. In National Association, Ginsburg worried that the mailing list would fall into the hands of an unscrupulous person who would attempt to take advantage of the retired and
disabled employees. 110 In Albuquerque PublishingCo., the court focused
on the possibility that a requester could learn the names of others involved in drug trafficking whose identities had not been revealed during
the trial."' The perceived likelihood of subsequent misuse of the information has caused the courts to view a broad range of information as
inherently private. The courts, having determined that the information
is private, then can engage in a balancing test that results in excluding
more information from the public than is appropriate under the FOIA.
The FOIA's major objective is to allow the public easy access to government information, not to protect individual privacy. By hiding information in the cloak of individual privacy, courts ignore and distort the
FOIA's prime objective.
C.

Threshold Language of Exemption 7" Compiledfor Law
Enforcement Purposes

The threshold test of Exemption 7 is whether the requested documents are "compiled for law enforcement purposes. 11 2 In John Doe
Agency v. John Doe Corp.1 3 the Supreme Court undertook a careful examination of the threshold test for Exemption 7, reaching a conclusion
that will substantially influence the future disclosure of any government
records that later become incorporated into a law enforcement file. The
Supreme Court held that a routine audit report, which eventually formed
the basis for prosecuting the defense contractor Grumman Corporation 14 for contract fraud, was compiled for law enforcement purposes
and therefore, was protected under Exemption 7.115 The courts treat the
Exemption 7 test as consisting of two prongs: first, courts examine
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
See Albuquerque Publishing Co., 726 F. Supp. at 856 n.6.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988).
110 S.Ct. 471 (1989).
Although the corporation's identity was not supposed to be revealed during the litigation,

the lawyers for the Grumman Corporation inadvertently disclosed the names of the litigants in a
joint appendix to the case. The corporate party was the Grumman Corporation and the government
parties were identified as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA). Himelstein, Anonymous No More" Fried, Frank Slip-Up Unveils "John Doe
Corp.," Legal Times, May 22, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
115. John Doe Agency, 110 S.Ct. at 477.
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whether the documents are investigatory records, and second, they inquire whether the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes.1 16 The John Doe Agency Court eased the government's burden
under the second prong of the Exemption 7 threshold test by permitting
materials merely gathered together in a law enforcement fie to fall

within the phrase "compiled for law enforcement purposes." This shift
did not come without a struggle; the Court in John Doe Agency was
deeply divided on whether the definition of "compiled" means gathered
or collected, or whether it requires some type of creative process that
117
would exclude mere collection of records.
John Doe Agency"" arose over correspondence and routine audit
reports fied by Grumman at the request of the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) in 1978. Eight years later these reports formed the basis of a grand jury investigation of Grumman for contract fraud. Grumman went to court to force the DCAA to relinquish the audit reports.
The DCAA denied Grumman's request and two days later transferred
the requested records to the FBI. Grumman argued that the audit reports were not subject to Exemption 7 because they had not been compiled for law enforcement purposes. The FBI, however, refused to
release the reports, claiming that the records were protected under Exemption 7(A)." 9 A district court judge determined that the DCAA did
not have to deliver the documents, 120 but the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that compiled essentially meant "created" in the context of Exemption 7.121 The court of appeals ruled that the government may not
invoke Exemption 7(A) to protect materials that are not investigatory
records when originally collected, but which subsequently acquire inves12 2
tigatory significance.
In reversing, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted that
the Second Circuit's decision interpreted the word "compiled" to mean
"originally compiled."' 123 Justice Blackmun, however, noted that the
common use of compile means "something composed of materials col116. See Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
117. John Doe Agency, 110 S.Ct. at 477; id.at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. 850 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1988).
119. Id. Exemption 7(A) concerns "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" which if released would "interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)
(1988).
120. John Doe Agency, 850 F.2d at 107.
121. See id.at 107-08.
122. Id. at 109. The court of appeals stated, "The attempt in the instant case to withhold documents generated in the course of routine audits because they are now part of an investigatory file
thus contravenes the obvious intent of the 1974 Amendments to FOIA." Id.
123. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S.Ct. 471, 476 (1989).
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lected and assembled from various sources or other documents."1 24 This
definition contained no requirement that compilation occur at a specific
time.
To arrive at this definition, Justice Blackmun examined the legislative history of the 1974 Amendment to Exemption 7.125 When originally
enacted, Exemption 7 protected from disclosure "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes." 126 Justice Blackmun determined
that Congress enacted this exemption because it recognized that law enforcement agencies legitimately needed to keep certain records confidential in order to prevent harm to investigations and to eventual
enforcement. 127 In 1974, Congress amended the language of Exemption
7 to narrow its scope by substituting the phrase "investigatory records"
for "investigatory files." 128 Justice Blackmun noted that Congress
amended the Exemption in response to a series of D.C. Circuit decisions
129
that exempted material simply because it was in an investigatory file.
The amendment, instead of merely requiring that the agency show that
the withheld document was part of an investigatory fie, imposed an affirmative obligation on the agency to demonstrate that the disclosure of
each document in an investigatory fie could cause one of the harms
listed in Exemption 7.130 Justice Blackmun argued that the amended Ex124. Id
125. Id at 477.
126. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967).
127. John Doe Agency, 110 S. Ct. at 477. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1966) (House Report interpreted Exemption 7 as preventing harm to agency litigation where files
are related to enforcement of all kinds of laws); see also DEPARTMENT OF JusTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 23-24 (1967) (Attorney General stated that the exemption would prevent harm to
any investigation concerned with a potential violation of the law).
128. 120 CONG. REC. 36,871 (1974) (substitution of "investigatory records" for "investigatory
ifies" in order to prevent an agency from commingling non-exempt records in an investigatory file).
129. In four decisions in 1973 and 1974, the D.C. Circuit broadened the interpretation of Exemption 7. Rather than focusing on preventing adverse consequences to pending enforcement actions (which had been the original concern for the exemption), the court introduced an automatic
exemption for any file that was investigatory in nature. See Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race
and Urban Issues v. Weinburger, 502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court held that when the
records are "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes," there is no requirement that
adjudication is likely or imminent in order for Exemption 7 to apply); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d
1073 (D.C. Cir.) (court said Exemption 7 applies where enforcement proceedings were probable),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(court exempted a report on My Lai massacre, even though the enforcement and investigation proceedings concerning the incident were complete); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (court held that 10 year old investigatory files on Kennedy assassination were
exempt, despite the fact that no law enforcement proceedings were anticipated), cert. dented, 416
U.S. 993 (1974).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988) states:
This section does not apply to matters that are ... (7) records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforce-
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emption 7 necessitated-when an exemption was claimed-an examina-

tion of the nature of each document within a file.' 3 1 This requirement
thus provided adequate protection against an agency slipping noninvestigatory information into investigatory files in order to prevent disclosure.
Justice Blackmun stated that:
We thus do not accept the distinction the Court of Appeals drew between documents that originally were assembled for law-enforcement
purposes and those that were not so originally assembled but were
gathered later for such purposes. The plain language of Exemption 7
does not permit such a distinction. Under the statute, documents need
only to have been
compiled when the response to the FOIA request
132
must be made.
By providing a blanket exemption for any document that agencies
possess that relates to law enforcement, the majority opinion goes too far.
The 1974 Amendments were designed to prevent such a result by placing
a larger burden on the government when it attempted to invoke Exemption 7. Relying on legislative history, the majority focused exclusively on
the congressional addition of the specified harms that support the use of
the exemption. Yet, the majority ignored the overall legislative intent
behind the amendment-to limit the exemption to records created by law
enforcement.
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Marshall, reached a conclusion more in accord with congressional intent in their interpretation
of the definition of "compiled". 133 Justice Scalia noted that the word
ment records or information (a) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (b) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (c)could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (d) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source, including a State, local or foreign agency or authority or any private institution

which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawfil national security intelligence investigation,
information furnished by a confidential source, (e) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (f) could reasonably be expected to endanger
the life or physical safety of any individual....
131. John Doe Agency, 110 S.Ct. at 477.
132. Id. at 476-77.
133. See id. at 481 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Justice Stevens, in a separate
dissent, agreed with the standard the court stated in regards to "compilation" but disagreed on its
application to this case. He stated:
[U]nder the FOIA, records or information whose production would interfere with enforcement proceedings are exempt only when, by virtue of their "incorporat[ion] in a law enforcement 'mosaic,"' they take on law enforcement significance.... [ T]he Government
has at most established a request by a prosecutor that the requested documents be kept
secret and a naked transfer of otherwise nonexempt documents from a civilian agency to
the FBI. Such a transfer is not a compilation.
Id.at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Gould Inc. v. GSA, 688 F. Supp. 689,
698 (D.D.C. 1988)).
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"compiled" is ambiguous; it does not always refer simply to the process
of gathering or assembling, but rather can connote a more creative activity.' He pointed out that if "compiled" meant "gathered," there would
be no realistic way to prevent bad faith compilations by the agencies,
"given the loose standard of need that will justify opening an investigation, and the loose standard of relevance that will justify including material in the investigatory file."' 35 If used creatively, the phrase "records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes" would encompass
information the government has acquired or produced for other reasons.1 36 This definition, Justice Scalia suggested, would exclude information that an agency acquired and later shifted into a law enforcement
ilMe.

13 7

Justice Scalia also questioned the majority's reliance on the requirement that exempted material implicate one of the harms listed in Exemption 7 to prevent agencies from withholding non-law enforcement
records. He argued that "[C]ongress did not extend protection to all
documents that produced one of the six specified harms, but only to such
documents 'compiled for law enforcement purposes.'"138 This sort of
protection, according to Justice Scalia, would allow the agency to collect
documents it wanted to keep secret, and subsequently prevent their disclosure simply by arguing that there was a law enforcement rationale
39
behind the agency action.'
The split in the Supreme Court reflected a similar disagreement
among the lower courts with regard to the correct interpretation of the
Exemption 7 threshold. Although the lower courts are divided on the
meaning of "compiled," two of the most recent and thorough decisions
sided with the Supreme Court's ruling. In Gould Ina v. GSA, Judge
Sporkin ruled that a routine audit report had been compiled for law enforcement purposes once it formed the basis of a criminal investigation.14 0 He found that the document's current function was the key
134. Id at 480. Justice Scalia gave several examples in his dissent to illustrate the narrowness of
the majority's definition of "compiled." Scalia stated,
When we say that a statesman has "compiled an enviable record of achievement," or that a
baseball pitcher has "compiled a 1.87 earned run average," we do not mean that those
individuals have pulled together papers that show those results, but rather that they have

generated or produced those results.
Id.
135. Id. at 481.
136. Id at 480. See Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources In Statutory and ConstitutionalInterpretation: How CongressAlways Loses, 1990 DuKE L.J. 160, 172.
137. John Doe Agency, 110 S. Ct at 480.
138. Id at 481.
139. Id
140. 688 F. Supp. 689, 698 (D.D.C. 1988).
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factor in deciding whether or not it could be withheld. Judge Sporkin
seemingly took for granted that the release of non-law enforcement material residing in an investigatory file could cause just as much harm as
releasing law enforcement records. 14 1 He observed that a contrary ruling
would force agencies to segregate their investigatory files from their
materials that had been obtained from non-exempt government sources.
According to Sporkin, these materials then would be subject to disclosure regardless of the impact the disclosure might have on a continuing
criminal investigation. 142 He stated that "[the making of such distinctions among materials based on their sources is not appropriate, is not
required by the FOIA or the case law, and clearly was not contemplated
by the legislators who enacted and amended the FOIA."'14 3
Judge Richey reached the same conclusion in Crowell and Moring v.
Departmentof Defense, holding that "compile" had a meaning different
from "create" or "generate." 144 He observed that "[tlo construe the
1974 Amendments as infusing in Exemption 7 a requirement that a record be created initially for a law enforcement purpose may well lead to
results inconsistent with the purpose of the 1974 amendment." 145 In addition, Judge Richey noted that records or information serve a law enforcement purpose if they had a law enforcement purpose at the time of
their generation by an agency. He concluded that although certain
materials might have been created originally by a non-law enforcement
agency for a non-law enforcement purpose, "it [did] not necessarily follow that the record or piece of information cannot subsequently play an
important role in a criminal investigation undertaken by a criminal law
enforcement agency at a future date." 146 He therefore determined that
protection from disclosure was required for these types of materials. 14 7
Based upon the differing views of Exemption 7 presented by Justices
Blackmun and Scalia, a tension over the proper threshold test will continue. Because Blackmun currently represents the majority of the Court,
routine records that at one point were available will become unavailable
when made part of an investigative file-at least until lower courts can
distinguish factual patterns from the one presented in John Doe Agency.
One safeguard does exist: As Justice Blackmun pointed out, an agency
must still prove that release of the records would implicate one of the
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id
Id.
Id
703 F. Supp. 1004, 1009-1010 (D.D.C. 1989).
Id at 1010.
Id
See/i
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harms listed in Exemption 7. However, as Justice Scalia noted, agencies
will easily satisfy that threshold.
Justice Scalia is right to argue that the John Doe Agency decision
gives the agencies too much power to withhold agency records at will.
The decision in John Doe circumvents Congress' purpose in enacting the
1974 Amendments. Congress clearly did not intend for the 1974
Amendments to create a blanket nondisclosure for particular kinds of
investigatory records. Indeed, this type of broad judicial latitude toward
law enforcement agency records led to the 1974 Amendments to Exemption 7.148 Through its decision in John Doe Agency the Court successfully expanded Exemption 7 to shield from public scrutiny any
information collected--either initially or subsequently-for a law enforcement purpose. Congress must now respond if it feels that once
again the courts have provided too much protection for law enforcement
records. Until Congress acts, however, recent cases show that the courts
will allow agencies to withhold information merely through placement in
a law enforcement fie.
D.

North v. Walsh: A Reaffirmation of the FOIA in the Discovery
Context

During his trial, Oliver North filed an information request under the
FOIA to seek documents that would reveal the extent of the Independent
Counsel's reliance on North's congressional testimony. In North v.
Walsh, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed that a FOIA request cannot be denied
merely because it appears to be a substitute for discovery. 14 9 Reversing
the district court ruling against North, the court held that the FOIA
permitted North to fie a separate FOLA action to obtain information
useful in a non-FOLA proceeding. 150
148. The 1974 Amendment to Exemption 7 was clearly in response to the broadening of the

Exemption by the D.C. Circuit. Senator Kennedy stated on the floor of the Senate that he supported
the amendment to Exemption 7 because the recent D.C. Circuit cases had "applied the seventh
exemption ...woodenly and mechanically and, I believe, in direct contravention of congressional
intent when we passed that law in 1966." 120 CONG. REc. 17,034 (1974).
149. 881 F.2d 1088, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See Project, Government Information and the
Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 1149 (1975) (noting that one of the major problem areas
with the FOIA was discovery issues involving a tension between the civil and criminal rules of
discovery and the FOIA). Usually a party in litigation in a federal court with the government
through discovery can obtain most information relevant to the proceedings that is not privileged.
Under the FOIA, any person can seek agency material without having to give a reason (such as
relevance to a pending proceeding) for disclosure.
150. North, 881 F.2d at 1096-97; see also Tomlison, Use of FOIA for Discovery, 43 MD.L. RnV.
119 (1984) (analyzing the advantages that the FOIA provides litigants in comparison to the normal
methods of document discovery). North had been convicted of three counts of the indictment issued
by the grand jury and acquitted on six others, while the courts considered his FOIA appeal.
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The dispute in North's FOLA case evolved because North was using
various methods of discovery to determine whether any of his congressional testimony had been revealed to the Independent Counsel or his
staff.15 1 District Court Judge Oberdorfer denied North's FOIA requests,
relying on claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and the FOIA Exemption
7(A). 15 2 Because North had been unsuccessful in obtaining this information through regular discovery channels, Judge Oberdorfer held that the
claim was barred based on claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Further, the district court held that the documents fell within Exemption
7(A), which exempts from disclosure "records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes" if production can "reasonably be ex1 53
pected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.'
Judge Ruth Ginsburg, in an opinion for the D.C. Circuit, reversed
the holding that issue and claim preclusion prevented North from bringing the FOLA suit. l5 4 First, Ginsburg examined whether North's FOIA
claim was precluded because he could have raised it during the grand
jury proceedings. 5 5 She noted that it was impossible for North to assert
his FOLA rights in a grand jury proceeding; therefore, claim preclusion
was inapplicable. FOLA procedures require that the person seeking disclosure-after pursuing an administrative process-must file a complaint
to trigger court action. Because no complaint could have been interposed in the grand jury proceeding, there was no possibility of claim
56
preclusion.1
Judge Ginsburg dismissed the issue preclusion argument as well, observing that Judge Oberdorfer's characterization of the issue-whether
North had a legal right to the documents-was too broad.15 7 While acknowledging that the objective of both requests was the same-to obtain
documents from the Office of the Independent Counsel-Judge Ginsburg
noted that the determinative issues were in fact quite different.' 5 8 In the
grand jury setting, the court must determine whether the documents
151. North. 881 F.2d at 1090. North had requested over 25 categories of documents from the
Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC) under the FOIA. The major subject of these inquiries was
the OIC's contacts with the news media and with Congress, and the efforts the OIC had made to
insulate its staff from exposures to North's congressional testimony for which he had been given

immunity.

152. Id. at 1092-93.
153. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1988).
154. North 881 F.2d at 1093-97.
155. Id. at 1093.
156. Id. at 1093-95.
157. Id. at 1095.
158. Id. See Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of Information Act
and the FederalDiscovery Rules, 49 GEo.WASH. L. REv. 843 (1981) (noting that the balancing of
interests found in the discovery context is not present in FOIA litigation).
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were relevant and necessary to North's challenge to the constitutionality
of the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act.
However, under North's FOIA action, no showing of relevance or need
was required to obtain the requested documents. Thus, the sole issue
concerned whether the documents were properly withheld under one of
the specific statutory exemptions.1 59
In deciding whether the documents could be properly withheld
under Exemption 7(A), 160 Judge Ginsburg noted that to withhold these
documents the agency must show that disclosure would interfere with
the remaining enforcement proceedings. 16 1 The Office of Independent
Counsel failed to assert how disclosure of the information North sought
"reasonably harmed" the government's case or impeded its investigation.
The Office of Independent Counsel argued that the release of the requested information would upset the congressionally approved balance of
resources between prosecution and defense. This argument failed to assert the interference necessary to invoke the FOIA Exemption 7(A). 162
A defendant may obtain documents under the FOIA that he could not
procure through discovery (or at least more quickly than he could obtain
them through discovery) without interfering with a law enforcement proceeding. Therefore, an individual may obtain information under the
FOIA that may be useful in non-FOIA litigation, even when the documents sought could not be obtained through discovery. Judge Ginsburg
concluded by stating that, "FOIA is itself a congressionally-approved resource open to every person regardless of the requester's status as a crim163
inal defendant."
Despite the problems associated with the use of the FOIA for discovery purposes, 164 Judge Ginsburg was correct to allow North access to
these records. The argument that individuals who want to use the FOIA
for discovery purposes should be denied is premised upon the belief that
litigants do not need the FOIA because they have-or will have-access
to discovery. However, when the government makes an inadequate dis159. North 881 F.2d at 1095-97.
160. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1988).
161. North. 881 F.2d at 1097. For cases in which Exemption 7(A) did prevent the disclosure of

materials because of a feared interference with a criminal investigation, see NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978) (Supreme Court, fearing intimidation of witnesses, held that
Exemption 7(A) allowed NLRB to withhold witnesses' statements); Lewis v. IRS, 823 F.2d 375, 378
(9th Cir. 1987) (exempting from disclosure documents relating to criminal investigation because
names of witnesses would be revealed as well as would the scope of the investigation).
162. See North, 881 F.2d at 1098-99.
163. Id.at 1099. See Tomlison, supra note 150, at 127 (1984) (arguing that "[d]iscrimination
based on a requester's status is inconsistent with the FOLA's basic goal of providing all members of
the public with first level access to information about the operations of government").
164. See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S.Ct. 471, 475-76 (1989).
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covery search, raises a privilege claim, obtains a protective order, or contends that the documents sought are irrelevant, a litigant needs the FOIA
as much as any other private citizen. To deny a litigant the use of the
FOTA would undermine the FOIA's purpose of increased public access
to government documents.

II.

ADMIISTRATIVE CHANGES iN

FOIA FOR 1989

In several instances in 1989, administrative agencies acted in ways
that altered the operation of the FOLA. The Department of Justice
promulgated new guidelines to help agencies implement the Reporters
Committee decision. In general, these guidelines make access to information more difficult and more expensive for the requester. In contrast, the
OTA and the OMB attempted to ease the access to computerized information under the FOTA. Both agencies encouraged Congress to specifically include electronic information within the scope of the Act so that
agencies would not limit access to this material.
A.

The Department of Justice Issues Guidance Report for Agencies on
the Reporters Committee Decision

Subsequent to the decision in Reporters Committee, 165 the Justice
Department's Office of Information and Privacy (OIP) issued its interpretation 166 of the ruling. In the report, the OIP set forth the scope of
the decision and suggested principles that agencies should consider in
determining when and how to apply the privacy exemptions of the
FOIA. The OIP viewed the decision as a "strikingly broad victory" for
the government because it not only clarified the law, but also strengthened the protection of personal privacy under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). 167
Moreover, the OIP observed that the decision most likely would extend
to items other than rap sheets. The OIP took every opportunity to
broaden further the privacy exemptions of the FOIA, and thus, prevent
the use of the FOIA by those who only wish to gain information concerning private citizens.
Most importantly, the OIP stated that the Supreme Court decision
had resulted in a new balancing test for the privacy exemptions which
165. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
166. Step-by-Step Decisionmaking supra note 13, at 7.
167. DEPARTMENT OF JUsTIcE, Reporters Committee Decided Broadly, FOIA UPDATE, Spring
1989, at 4 [hereinafter Reporters Committee Decided Broadly];see also JusticeReleases Guidance on
Reporters Committee Case, 15 AccESS Rep. (Monitor Pub. Co.) No. 16, at 6-7 (August 9, 1989)
(OIP argued that principles set forth in the Reporters Committee decision to protect privacy under
Exemption 7(C) also would apply to Exemption 6).
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now tilted toward protecting privacy instead of allowing disclosure.1 6 8
For example, the OIP noted that the government can invoke the new
standard to protect personal information that already may be publicly
available. 169 The Reporters Committee decision indicated that substantial privacy interests can exist in personal information even though the
public could obtain that same information at an earlier time. Thus, the
OIP observed that limited public availability does not disqualify information from privacy protection under the FOIA because, in this situation, a
privacy interest still exists in maintaining "practical obscurity." 170 By
creating this "practical obscurity" standard, the OIP noted that the
Court wanted to keep personal information away from public scrutinyespecially when that information appears in a federal compilation. 171
The OIP also stated that the Reporters Committee decision mandated that agencies not consider the identity of a FOLA requester when
deciding whether to release information. 172 This requirement further
tilts the balancing test away from disclosure as requesters, particularly
those involved in educational or scientific institutions, can no longer
claim a special right of access based on their status as public servants.
The OIP noted that "the Court made it unmistakably clear, once and for
all, that agencies should treat all requesters alike in making FOIA disclosure decisions." 1 73 Stating that "an agency will not invoke an exemption
to protect a requester from himself," the guidance principles point out
that the only exemption to this rule occurs when a requester wants to
receive information about himself.174 Therefore, the OIP cautioned that
an agency-which makes a determination on a FOLA request for information about a third party-should allow the requester access only to
information that could be released to "any member of the general pub168. Step-by-Step Decisionmakin&supra note 13, at 7 ("The new guiding principles set forth in
Reporters Committee ... alter the mechanics of the basic 'balancing process' by which privacyprotection decisions are to be made under these exemptions.").
169. Id.at 6. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763 (Court stated that the limited public availa.
bility of an item of personal information does not disqualify it from privacy protection under the

FOIA).
170. Justice Releases Guidance on Reporters Committee Case, supra note 167, at 6.
171. See Agencies Restrict Public Access to Computerized Government Information, Daily Rep.
for Exec. (BNA) No. 203, at C-I (Oct. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Agencies RestrictPublicAccess] (noting
that a concern of the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee was the ease of access to records
contained in large federal databases).
172. Reporters Committee Decided Broadly, supra note 167, at 5. See Reporters Comm., 489
U.S. at 771 (Court stated that a FOIA requester's identity can have "no bearing on the merits of his

or her FOIA request").
173. Justice Releases Guidance on Reporters Committee Case, supra note 167, at 7.
174. Step-by-Step Decisionmaking supra note 13, at 6. ("Agencies should be especially careful

not to disclose personal information to any third party requester that they would withhold as exempt
from any member of the general public.").

Vol. 1990:1113]

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

1141

liC."' 75 This approach does not allow agencies to consider the special
circumstances that surround individual FOIA requesters-something the
courts previously had taken into account when balancing the interests of
privacy and disclosure 176
The OIP further indicated that agencies should no longer consider
the purposes of the request. 17 7 The OP was consolidating the shift from
the traditional case-by-case balancing to a categorical approach. The Reporters Committee decision, the 0IP asserted, effectively overturned the
traditional balancing test that was based on the requester's proposed use
178
of the information.
After Reporters Committee, the OIP argued that the agency had to
evaluate the type of the requested document and its connection to the
public interest. This new approach, according to the OP,removed any
uncertainty that agencies had experienced when determining how to treat
FOIA requesters who were attempting to gain access to information but
had a different "public interest" than bringing to light government action.179 Now agencies need consider only whether the information requested will increase the public's awareness of how that governmental
agency operates.
The OIP also stated that the most significant change the Supreme
Court made in Reporters Committee was to narrow the concept of "public interest" under the privacy exemptions of the Act. 8 0 The Court's
sharp limitation of the concept of "public interest" to the disclosure of
information about the operations of government will limit public access
to certain material that relates to private individuals. Under the Court's
core purpose concept, information must pertain to the activities of government to qualify for public interest consideration. Before a court undertakes to balance interests, it must first determine that disclosure will
identify a "public interest" that qualifies for balancing under the "core
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
177. JusticeReleases Guidanceon ReportersCommittee Case, supra note 167, at 6. See Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 771-72.
178. Id. See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text; see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at
772. (Court held that public interest balancing should be conducted without regard to "the particular purpose for which the document is being requested").
179. Justice Releases Guidance on Reporters Committee Case, supra note 167, at 6. The DOJ

pronounced that the Court, in fact, had overruled the Getman "public interest" approach. This
approach had examined the requester's particular circumstances and intentions to serve a public
interest through his use of the requested information. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675-77
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that granting a labor law professor access to an employee name and address list for proposed empirical study of union electoral processes would serve a powerful public
interest).
180. Justice Releases Guidance on Reporters Committee Case, supra note 167, at 6. The OIP
pointed out that the narrowing of public interest will have a large effect on FOIA decisionmaking.

1142

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1990:1113

purpose" standard.18 1 The OIP strongly emphasized the Court's assertion that most personal information would reveal little or no information
182
about the activities and operations of the government.
Lastly, the OIP encouraged agencies to use categorical balancing
under Exemption 7(C). Under this "categorical balancing," the agency
may determine that a certain type of information is always protected
18 3
under Exemption 7(C), "without regard to individual circumstances."
The OIP further suggested that agencies examine their own records and
remove those that appear to pose a threat to privacy interests, and there18 4
fore, require categorical exemption from the FOIA.
The ON guidelines incorrectly advocate a broad implementation of
the Reporters Committee decision by administrative agencies. The
FOTA's major purpose is to allow access to government documents, not
to protect an individual's privacy. Under the old balancing test, the
Court could factor in many different variables such as the identity of the
requester and the purpose of the request, as well as the individual's privacy interest. Because the balancing approach incorporated numerous
elements, and particularly because of the Court's explicit examination of
the requester's purpose for the information, requesters usually succeeded
in their requests. Although the Court used the balancing approach only
for the "rap sheets," the DOJ carried the Court's analysis further to
cover all documents that agencies have in their files concerning private
individuals.
Although the guidelines from the OIP simplify and clarify the inquiry into what types of information an agency should release, they also
permit administrative agencies to deny access to government documents
based on the mere possibility of harm to an individual's privacy rights.
To grant agencies such discretion contradicts the FOIA's purpose of assuring free and open access to information. There is no sound policy
reason for the agencies to broadly protect a right to privacy under the
FOIA. Further, too much information potentially falls within the OIP's
broad definition of privacy interests. Consequently, much information
that should be disseminated is subject to a categorical approach that denies disclosure.

181. Id
182. See id
183. Id
184. Id (Supreme Court's conclusion that rap sheets are categorically excluded provides basis
for identification of other records that also might require such protection).
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B. Agency Responses to the Problems of Computerized Records and
the FOIA
As more and more government information is stored in electronic
form, policymakers must struggle with the question of just how far the
government should go to make such information easily available to the
public. Recently, federal agencies have attempted to design policies to
deal with computerized information under the FOIA. The difficulty in
developing new policies arises because Congress plainly did not anticipate an "electronic" federal environment when it enacted the FOIA
twenty-three years ago. In addition, the FOIA contains no clear, statutory definition of the term "agency record" to apply to the area of computer information.1 5 Because increasing amounts of information are
stored on computers, the agencies need to develop new ways to respond
to FOIA requests for computer records. Currently, no uniform guidelines exist to help the agencies determine which requests for electronic
information they must fulfill.
1. OMB Proposes Policy Statement on Electronic Information.
During 1989, the OMB issued two policy statements in which it announced a new position on the availability of government information in
electronic form. 186 Both the original and revised OMB Reports addressed the topic of dissemination in electronic media. The OMB stated
that an electronic format frequently was of greater use to the requester
18 7
because it often is an exact copy of a government electronic database.
In further support of public access to information in electronic format,
the OMB noted that these formats, databases, computer programs and
indexes, and the like, contained more information that was more easily
accessible by the user. 88 One of the major changes made in the OMB's
policy related to the agencies' development of their own software that
increased accessibility to agency databases. 18 9 Initially, the OMB opposed agency creation of software; they felt that the private sector could
185. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
186. The OMB issued an initial report in January, 1989 but was forced to revise a number of its
views due to the negative reactions generated by the report. OMB Signals Retreat on Information
Policy, 15 AccEss Rep. (Monitor Pub. Co.) No. 12, at 4 (June 14, 1989).
187. OMB Issues Proposed Policy on Electronic Information, 15 Access Rep. (Monitor Pub.)
No. 1, at 6 (Jan. 11, 1989) [hereinafter OMB Issues ProposedPolicy]. Electronic formats include
computer databases, programs, and indexes.
188. Id. at 5.
189. The OMB endorsed the traditional distinction that restricts the government's role to wholesaling and leaves retailing to private firms. The problem with this approach is that purely private
dissemination of government information does not ensure public availability in all cases. See Moore,
Access Denied, NAT'L J., Jan. 1990, at 5.
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perform this feature satisfactorily. 190 The OMB later amended this portion of its report and stated that the dissemination of products should be
tailored to users' needs and that software development often is a legitimate federal activity. 191
The report also discussed what the OMB viewed as an alarming increase in user charges. The OMB indicated that the appropriate costs to
recover are the costs that were spent in disseminating and in preparing
the information for dissemination. 92 OMB pointed out that user
charges that exceed the cost of dissemination prevent people from obtaining information due to an inability to pay. Because the government
already has paid for the costs of creating these records, OMB suggested
that the information should be distributed at the cost of distribution. 193
The OMB strongly asserted that this is not an area in which agencies
should make profits, stating that:
[I]f an agency has a positive obligation to place a given product in the
hands of certain specific groups or members of the public, and also
determines that user charges will constitute a significant barrier to discharging this obligation, the agency may have grounds for reducing or
eliminating its user charges for the product, or for exempting some
194
recipients from charge.
The OMB's changes would affirm the public's right to access electronic communication. Not only would costs to users be as low as possible, but fees also would be waived when appropriate. Federal agencies
would still consider competing efforts by information companies, but the
new provisions would reject privatization as the solution in all instances.
OMB still would determine government information policy, but agencies
would be given more latitude to decide their own policy of data
dissemination.
2. Administrative Conference and the OTA Report. The Administrative Conference of the United States during the past year also examined the general subject of federal information acquisition and
dissemination policy. 195 Focusing on the FOIA, it observed that
"[d]ifferences in technologies and database structures used by individual
agencies make it necessary, for the near term, to define FOIA obligations
on a case-by-case basis."' 196 Technology has outpaced the FOIA, which
190. OMB Signals Retreat on Information Policy, supra note 186, at 4.

191.
192.
193.
194.

Id
See id
See id
Id

195. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.88-10 (1990).
196. Id
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was drafted with only paper records in mind. The report warns that
without congressional action on the electronic format issue, erosion in
overall access to federal information will occur.
This discussion of the FOIA and computer information by the Administrative Conference, in part, was a response to a comprehensive report issued by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 197 that
addressed the overall subject of electronic information dissemination in
the federal government last year. 198 One chapter of this major study explored the FOIA's operation in an "electronic" environment and recommended administrative and legislative solutions to difficult "electronic"
access problems. 99 The authors of the study urged Congress to reconsider the FOIA policies to address the special problems of access to gov2 °
ernment electronic data. 0
The report suggested the adoption of new, more specific statutory
guidelines for the FOTA as one possible solution.20 ' The report noted
that both greater statutory specificity and objective criteria for a definition of agency record would continue to ensure an adequate level of access. Currently, there are no explicit guidelines for agencies to follow
when programming their computers to extract information requested
under the Act. There also are no guidelines to indicate to agencies the
form in which they must release data. The development of a concrete
definition would greatly aid requesters in obtaining government information. The current lack of a definition allows agencies to make use of any
ambiguity to deny access.
To address properly the impact of new technologies on the FOIA,
however, and before new procedures can be developed, the report argued
that Congress reconsider the purposes and goals of the FOIA. The report noted that in the past the FOIA has been interpreted narrowly as a
basic "access to records" statute. 20 2 However, in the computer age, the
report urged that a better approach would be for Congress to expand the
197. OTA is a non-partisan agency that helps Congress deal with highly technical issues.
198. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 20; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY (1986).

199. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 20, at 207-36 (1988).
200. Id. at 236.
201. The broad language of the 1966 Act speaks only in terms of "information." Act of July 4,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). Subsequent revisions have not contributed much in
the way of guidelines. In 1974, language was included in the Senate report directing agencies to
perform computerized searches that were 'Tunctionally analogous to searches for records that [were]
maintained in conventional form." S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974). However, when
the FOIA was revised again in 1986, the computer access issue was not addressed. 5 U.S.C. § 552

(1988).
202. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 20, at 236.
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FOIA into an "access to information" statute.20 3 The report-although
advocating this broad interpretation of the FOIA-recognized that public access to computer information must be limited and balanced against
economic and personnel constraints of federal agencies. 2 °4 But the new,
broad purpose is necessary due to the explosive growth in electronic
2o5
information.
In addition, traditional views about records and searches, which
suggest that agencies are not required under the FOIA to create new
20 6
documents, need modification to ensure basic access to the FOIA.
Current case law as applied to "paper" information, however, establishes
that agencies need not necessarily create new records to meet requests.
Some agencies have held that when computer programming is requiredincluding procedures that call for only a few keystrokes-the result constitutes a new record. Because the creation of a new record is not required under the law, programming would not be required either-if this
position is upheld. 20 7 Many agencies store information on computers,
and therefore, some degree of reprogramming will be required to obtain

access to information. Many federal agencies have refused to run any
computer searches that involve new programming efforts, explaining that
the programming involves the creation of a new record, not production
208
of an old one.
203. See id.
204. IM.
205. Id. Another major problem with computer records is the ease with which they can be
destroyed. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1989) (court refused to dismiss suit
brought by National Security Archives against the Bush administration to prevent the erasing of
computer messages (E-Mail) that were sent by presidential and National Security Council staffers);
see also Blum, Freedom to Battle for Data: FOIA Still Perplexes Some of Its Cridta Nat'l L.L,
March 12, 1990, at 2 (quoting National Security Archives Deputy Director Thomas Blanton, "the
purpose of the suit is to jump start the administration and the National Archives... so we don't lose
history with the blip of a computer"). The National Security Archives wanted this case to make a
firm statement on the issue of the future storage of electronic records.
206. See INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 20, at 208. OTA noted that an especially vague
area of the law concerned the status of computer programs, online databases, integrated software,
and database systems. See Dismukes v. Department of Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760, 762-63 (D.D.C.
1984) (agency allowed to give a FOIA requester a microfiche record instead of the computer tape
requested).
207. In 1986, the DOJ litigated two cases involving programming requests. The DOJ argued
that a duty to write new programs would transform the government into a giant computer research
firm and constitute a wholesale departure from both existing law and the purposes of the FOIA. See
Kele v. Parole Comm'n, No. 85-4058 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 1986) (dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Public Citizen v. OSHA, No. 86-0705 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1986) (denying motion for summary judgment).
208. It is well-settled that agencies are not required to create new records to satisfy FOIA requests, yet agencies are required to disclose any reasonably segregable portion of requested records
after deletion of the portions which are exempt. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1988).
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Furthermore, in the past agencies were required under the FOLA to
make a "reasonable effort" to search for requested records to comply
with the public's requests for information. 20 9 The increased governmental use of computers, the report observed, may have changed the definition of what constitutes a reasonable search. The problem is to
determine how the computerization of records may have subtly changed
the definition of what constitutes a reasonable search. A few keystrokes
can now replace months or years of manual sorting and searching
through files. The use of computers expands the capability of agencies to
search for and to consolidate data for the requester. Because computer
searches are efficient and cost effective, the report argued that the definition of "reasonable search" could be broadened, thus increasing public
access. 2 10 The report also urged agencies to design new ways to respond
to FOTA requests for computer records.
The report also addressed whether the advantages of computer disks
and other electronic formats make the agencies responsible-at least in
some cases-for guaranteeing access. 21 1 Although congressional guidelines established that computer-stored information is subject to the
FOIA, 21 2 requesters usually are provided access to the information in a
paper format. If large quantities of data could be utilized more effectively by the requester when provided on magnetic tapes, disks, or online retrieval, then the report argues that access to these formats should
be granted. The report warned that "[i]f statutory language is not modified to address electronic information, agencies may have new opportu2 13
nity to legally withhold certain classes of materials from the public.
Although the OTA report left many questions unanswered, it does
clearly identify that current law no longer adequately reflects reality. Information technology could improve the public's ability to receive government data. The OTA report suggested that the federal government
should encourage broad public access to electronic information by interpreting the FOIA to cover electronic as well as paper records. OTA
explained that public access to information could be improved in several
ways, including: implementation of technical standards; development of
a government-wide information index to federal information products;
establishment centers to examine learning among federal agencies about
209. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 20, at 229; see also Agencies Restrict Public Access,

supra note 171 (urging new broader definition of reasonable search).
210. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 20, at 207.

211. Id.; see also Dismukes v. Department of Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding
that if government information is available in other media, such as paper or microfiche, an agency
does not have to disclose computer records).
212. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 20, at 236.

213. Id.
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information dissemination; and a government-wide electronic publishing
program.
In another development related to the complexity of "electronic record" issues that arise under the FOIA, the Office of Information and
Privacy (OIP) sent out a survey to all federal agencies concerning these
issues. 214 The OIP's survey seeks to gather information from individual
agencies on any existing agency position, practices, and concerns with
215
regard to this general subject area.
The survey contained several major issues that the OIP believed required immediate attention: whether the FOIA required agencies to create new computer programs or modify existing ones for search purposes
and processing, and whether the FOIA required agencies to provide
records in the particular forms specified by requesters.2 16 Also, the survey requested information on the agencies' perspectives concerning
whether computer software is an "agency record" under the FOIA.
Once the OIP receives the agencies' comments, it will compile the results
for use by the agencies and others in future determinations of "electronic
21 7
record" issues.
III.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

FOIA 1989

A. Amendment to Exemption 8
In recent years, due to the crisis in the savings and loan industry,
many Congressmen and reporters have become dissatisfied with the
FOIA's protection of banking records. In order to remedy the lack of
information the public had concerning the various savings and loan institutions, House Government Operations Committee Chairman Rep. John
Conyers sponsored an amendment to the Thrift Rescue and Reform
Bill 21 8 that would considerably narrow the scope of Exemption 8, which
bars disclosure of financial institutions' reports. Exemption 8 of the
FOIA specifically eliminates the general disclosure requirement for matters that are "contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
214. ELECTRONIC COLLECTION AND DSSEMNATION OF INFORMATION BY FEDERAL AGEN-

ciEs: A POLICY OVERVIEW, H.R. REP. No. 560, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-32 (1986).
215. DEPARTMENT OF JuSncE, OIP Takes "ElectronicRecord"Survey, FOIA UPDATE, Spring
1989, at 1-2; see also Blum, supra note 205, at 28. (Richard Huff, co-director of OIP states that his
officials "are looking into the issue of uniformity and are actively exploring new procedures.").
216. DEPARTMENT OF JusTicE, supra note 215, at 1.
217. aI.at 2; see also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, "ElectronicRecord" Survey Continues, FOXA
UPDATE, Summer 1989, at 2 (01P was forced to extend the deadline for responding to its study
because of the failure of several agencies to reply in a timely manner).
218. H.R. 1278, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
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responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions. '2 19
Conyers urged support of the amendment because it would allow public
access to agency information, thus enabling the public to protect itself
from a future banking crisis. 220
The Conyers Amendment would prevent the use of Exemption 8 in
two specific situations. Under the amendment, Exemption 8 would no
longer apply to:
(a) examination reports of federally insured depository institutions
that have been liquidated or have received financial assistance from the
FDIC or the FSLIC, and (b)... examination reports that provide a
federal banking agency's assessment of a federally insured depository
institution's performance under any statute designed to
prevent dis221
criminatory lending practices based on race or gender.
This amendment would permit public disclosure of examination reports
of institutions that have either been liquidated or received federal assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Thus, under the proposal, information that directly concerned the solvency and soundness of banks
and savings and loans would no longer be exempt. Other records, in222
cluding information about compliance with the Truth in Lending Act
223
and anti-discrimination laws, also would be available to the public.
In urging support of the amendment, Conyers noted that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and other regulators stood by as the savings
and loan industry collapsed.2 4 Most importantly, the press and the public had been blocked from receiving information about the insolvency of
various financial institutions during important stages of the savings and
loan crisis due to the blanket protection of Exemption 8. Exemption 8,
which covers all banking related information, is designed to prevent runs
on financial institutions that could be caused by the disclosure of raw
bank examination records and similar material. 225 Conyers argued, however, that there is no excuse for blocking public access to agency documents that deal with the health of an entire industry or compliance with
consumer protection and anti-discrimination laws.
219. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1988).
220. House Considers Changesin Exemption 8, 15 AccEss Rep. (Monitor Pub. Co.) No. 12, at 2
(June 14, 1989).
221. H.R. REP. No. 1270, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 1105 (1989).
222. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1988).
223. H.R. REP. No. 1270, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2, at 1106 (1989).
224. Others have reached the same conclusion. See e.g., Robb, Keating Links Regulators to
Savings Industry Woes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at D9, col. 1 (Charles Keating testified that the
regulatory system failed to anticipate the effects of deregulation in the early 1980s).
225. See House Considers Changes in Exemption 8, supra note 220, at 2 (discussing Conyers'
amendment and the need for public access to records of financial institutions).
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Part of Conyers' purpose in proposing the bill was to address the
extensive misuse of federal housing funds that occurred in his home district of Detroit.2 6 The proposed amendment would allow public disclosure of bank and thrift Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
examination reports.227 This type of disclosure is designed to allow the
public to track discriminatory lending practices based on race or gender,
commonly termed redlining. Noting that discriminatory practices were
crippling inner cities-because qualified black mortgage applicants were
four times more likely than white applicants to be rejected for home
mortgage loans-Conyers argued that "if these federally insured lenders
were not complying with these anti-redlining laws, we should not spend a
minimum of $100 billion to bail them out."'22s
During a meeting of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture on June 6,
1989,22 9 numerous public interest groups testified in support of some type
of limitation on Exemption 8.230 In general, these groups wanted more
access to information about financial institutions. 231 For example, Ralph
Nader stated that although Congress originally intended Exemption 8 to
protect records whose release could threaten the financial stability of a
bank or savings and loan, court opinions had expanded the Exemption's
range by applying it to a number of consumer protection bills and the
details on failed institutions. Nader urged the subcommittee to repeal
Exemption 8 or, at a bare minimum, to amend it so that it once again
served its original purpose of protecting the solvency and soundness of
financial institutions. 232 Nader concluded that "[d]isclosure of examination reports of institutions that have been liquidated or that have received
financial assistance from the federal government will place appropriate
pressure on the regulatory agencies to do their job because such disclosures will enable Congress to exercise effective oversight. ' 233
226. See id
227. See id
228. Seeki
229. GrantPublicAccess to FailedBank's Exam Report CRA Ratings ConsumerGroupsSay, 52
Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 24, at 1277 (June 12, 1989).
230. Since its enactment, Exemption 8 has been subject to serious debate concerning whether
such an exemption is really necessary to protect the financial institutions. See Davis, The Informalion Ac A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 Cm. L. REv. 761, 800-01 (1967) (critics of Exemption 8 noted
that its purpose was based on facts which no longer held true, and argued that since bank accounts
are insured and other protections and regulations are in place, bank reports no longer need to be
sheltered from public inspection).
231. Grant PublicAccess to FailedBanks Exam Reports, supra note 229, at 1277.
232. For further discussion of Conyers' Bill, see Agencies Restrict PublicAccess, supra note 171.
233. See id

Vol 1990:1113]

FREEDOM OFINFORMATION ACT

1151

The Subcommittee also heard testimony from Allen Fishbein of the
Center for Community Change and Jane Uebelhoer of the Association of
the Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). 234 Both

Fishbein and Uebelhoer noted that Exemption 8 impeded the monitoring
of bank compliance under the Community Reinvestment Act and the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.235 Uebelhoer stated that "ACORN believes that disclosure of CRA exams would result in better exams, better
bank performance, fewer protests, and fewer slums. ''236
Although Conyers' amendment failed to make it out of the Subcommittee, the move to amend Exemption 8 highlighted the need to limit its
scope. With the increasing desire for access to bank records and other
financial information, it is likely that Congress will continue to examine
ways to limit the scope of Exemption 8. Further, Conyers is correct to
argue that banks have no legitimate confidentiality interest that is not
adequately protected by other FOIA exemptions already. Other FOIA
exemptions, which bar disclosure of materials that would threaten national security, 237 personal privacy,238 the government's deliberative process, 239 and the competitive position of a company, 240 adequately cover
any interest that also might be involved in the disclosure of bank records.
Because of these other exemptions, Exemption 8 can be narrowed and
still function to protect the solvency of banks. In addition, if the public
and the Congress do not have the ability to obtain the financial reports
that document the failure of these institutions, it will be impossible for
them to determine what corrections and safeguards are necessary to prevent a repeat of the current crisis.
B. Kleczka Reintroduces Freedom of Information Improvements Bill
Representative Gerald Kleczka reintroduced the Freedom of Information Public Improvements Act.241 This version of the bill, which was
first introduced in 1985,242 builds off the original, but also includes several new provisions that address problems that have arisen since 1985.
234. See id
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

135 CONG. REC. E2352-05 (June 28, 1989).
Agencies Restrict Public Access, supra note 171, at C2.
5 U.S.C. § 552(bXl) (1988).
Id § 552(b)(6).
Id § 552(bX5).

240. Id § 552(bX4).
241. 135 CONG. REpc. H3316 (1989).
242. Representative Kleczka's Bill was the third attempt to enact these revisions. The first
FOIA improvements bill was introduced in 1985, 131 CONG. Rnc. H11491 (1985), and 134 CONG.
REc.H51 (1988) was introduced in 1988. These bills would have tightened up the national security
exemption while eliminating exemptions for internal personnel and financial institution records. The
acts also would have established federal penalties against agencies for violations, created a standard
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The Kleczka Bill focused on two major reforms to the current FOIA
law, electronic records and fee provisions. Although the Kleczka Bill
was not brought to a final vote in the House, 243 it did raise many of the
important problems that face the FOIA from new technology and other
developments.
The most important provision of Kleczka's Bill focused on the coverage of electronic records by the FOIA. 2 4 The amendment would have
directed government agencies to treat FOIA requests for computerized
information and other electronic information in the same way as information printed on paper. To accomplish this, the Bill would have codified coverage for electronic records by redefining the term "government
records" to include "computerized, digitized, and electronic information." 24 5 These new definitions would apply regardless of the medium on
which the information was stored. Further, the Bill would have granted
access to information stored on a computer by specifying that searches
would include "a reasonable amount of computer pfogramming necessary to identify records." 24 6
Kleczka feared that the original intent of the FOIA, which does not
mention computer records, would be undermined by the government's
practice of storing information on computers. 24 7 Because adequate
guidelines about computerized information do not exist, government
agencies and officials retain too much latitude for responding to requests
for information. The lack of a uniform standard, Kleczka argued, placed
new obstacles before those who sought access to federal computerized
information. Inconsistencies in the application of the FOIA to computerized records created unnecessary confusion in the law and discouraged
potential requesters from using the law. 248 Kleczka argued that reform
was necessary to ensure that access to information under the FOIA
would not be diminished simply because the information was maintained
in electronic form.
The Bill also addressed the problem of confusion over the current
fee provisions. 249 He noted that the fee waivers were not always granted
fee schedule for all agencies and added an exemption for news media, and standardized agency
record keeping of FOIA requests and replies.
243. 135 CONG. REc. H3316 (1989).
244. Kleczka Reintroduces FOI Improvements Bill, 15 AccEss Rep. (Monitor Pub.) No. 7, at 5
(July 12, 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 186-217.
245. 135 CONG. REC. H3316 (1989).
246. Id
247. See Agencies Restrict PublicAccess supra note 171 (discussing congressional attempts to
protect the FOIA from agency hostility to increased requests for computerized information).
248. See Kleczka Reintroduces FOI Improvements Bill,supra note 244, at 5.
249. 135 CONG. REC. H3316 (1989).
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to requesters who deserved them and that billing practices occasionally
were used to intimidate those seeking information. Therefore, the Bill
would have revised the fee provisions to, in Kleczka's words, "make[ ] it
easier for requesters to qualify for reduced fees by clarifying fee waiver
language enacted into law a part of the 1986 Omnibus Anti-Drug
bifl." 2 0° The bill also would have broadened the categories of those eligible for the reduced fees to include individuals and nonprofit organizations. 2 51 To prevent abuse of the fee waiver system, the bill included a
third group within the category that encompasses the media, educational
and scientific institutions---"nonprofit organization[s] that intend[ ] to
make the information available to the news media, [and] to any branch
'2 52
or agency of Federal, State, or local government or to the public.
In addition, to further clarify the fee structure, Kleczka's Bill would
have revised the public interest standard. The current standard-which
allows a waiver or reduction of fees when disclosure of information
would be in the public interest-would be broadened. Two additions
would allow waivers where "the information relates to a violation of law,
inefficiency, or administrative error by an agency" or where "the waiver
or reduction of fees is in the public interest because furnishing the information primarily benefits the general public. ' 253 Kleczka's Bill also
makes clear that "the publication, reproduction, resale, or other dissemination of information obtained by any person under this section from an
'254
agency is not a commercial use."
Those opposed to Kleczka's Bill argued that the FOIA did not require modernization to accommodate electronically maintained information.255 According to certain witnesses, 2 56 legislation is unnecessary
because the Act was written broadly enough to accommodate new technologies. Further, these critics argued that the courts generally have
supported liberal interpretations of the law, thus obviating the need for
legislative action. The concern that underlies the critics' position appears
to be the fear that opening up the FOIA to amendment could result in a
narrowing of its principles.
250. Id. See Kleczka ReintroducesFOI Improvements Bill supra note 244, at 5.
251. 135 CONG. REC. H3316 (1989).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Witnesses OpposeBill Amending the FOIA to Address Electronic DataIssues, 52 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) No.3, at 163 (July 17, 1989) (Ronald Plesser, an attorney with Piper & Marbury, Washington, D.C., testified that he believed that, "time and reasonable interpretation of the FOIA by the
courts will bring about a reasonable resolution of these issues.").
256. Id
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Kleczka's Bill did address many of the problems that agencies currently have in attempting to determine whether they must respond to
computerized information requests and what fees are appropriate to
charge. Congress needs to act to develop uniform guidelines for agencies. For instance, Kleczka's Bill contained a definition of "agency
records"-a definition lacking in the current Act.2 57 Congress needs to
adopt this definition to demonstrate its willingness to have the FOIA
apply to electronic information and also to establish that FOIA requests
for this information should be taken seriously.
What Kleczka's Bill did not address was data dissemination. OMB
is on the record as favoring private industry dissemination of electronic
information.2 58 The cost of developing the software necessary to allow
the private citizen access is just too expensive and could be handled better by those in private industry. 25 9 However, many interest groups fear
that private control of information would lead to high fees and the denial
of access to public citizens. Congress must set up guidelines on how
agencies should proceed to develop their own software products. Further, Congress needs to examine whether, in certain cases, private industry may provide a better and cheaper alterative to government
development. If private computer companies are less expensive, they
could be trusted to take the lead in processing information for the public
in some areas. Although Kleczka's bill was not voted on by the House,
Congress should continue to debate the issues it raised and pass legislation that would affirm the public's right to have access to electronic communication and at a low cost.
CONCLUSION

During the past year, the courts limited access to information
through the FOIA by expanding the scope of its exemptions; the exception to this rule is found in the Supreme Court's broad definition of
"agency records" announced in Tax Analysts.2 6" This new definition
states that records stored by the government in a central location-which
are already publicly available in various regional locations-are "agency
records" under the FOLA. However, because the Act still lacks a comprehensive definition of "agency records," courts will continue to face
this issue in the future. Administrative actions taken in 1989 attempted
257. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
258. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
259. Perritt, Government Information Goes On-Line, TECH. REV., Nov. 1989, at 60, 65-67; see
also Moore, supra note 189, at 6.
260. Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. 2841 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 25-55.
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to clarify the issue of access to electronic records, but the agencies failed
to release a definitive position for agencies to follow.
The Supreme Court redefined the threshold test for Exemption 7,
and thus enhanced agency ability to hide information in law enforcement
files. In the most significant decision of 1989, the Supreme Court held
that rap sheets were categorically exempt under Exemption 7 and that
courts no longer need to consider the public interest in disclosure due to
the potential of an adverse impact on privacy interests. 26 1 The Court
only considered the general policy of the FOIA in promoting disclosure
of government information when that information reveals how the government operates. Because the case involved what appeared to be an
insignificant invasion of privacy-the rap sheets were already publicly
available-this new categorical exemption has caused and will continue
to cause reduced disclosure when applied in other contexts.
The OTA encouraged a broader definition of "agency records" and
urged Congress to act in defining that term under the FOLA so that agencies would have clear guidance in determining which materials to indlude.262 The OTA was concerned by the proliferation of electronically
stored information kept by the government. Since the FOIA was enacted
before the extensive use of computers and since no definition of "agency
records" exists, the OTA feared that agencies might deny all access to
such records. The OMB, also reacting to the failure of the courts and
Congress to adequately define agency records, issued two policy statements concerning electronic records under the FOIA.263 The OMB
stated that agencies should treat electronically stored information in the
same fashion as they treat paper information. However, agencies still are
reluctant to give access to computerized information.
Although congressional hearings were conducted with regard to adding a new concrete definition of "agency records" that would include
computer records, Congress did not enact the amendments to the FOIA.
Until Congress does statutorily define "agency records," it is likely that
litigation over access to computerized information will increase. With
the courts and administrative agencies failing to act decisively in this
area, Congress should act to prevent further erosion of the FOIA's purpose. Congress needs to ensure that the various agencies and the courts

261. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
See supra text accompanying notes 56-85.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 198-213.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 186-94.
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do not continue to circumscribe the FOIA, and Congress can only do
this by specifically including certain items within the scope of the FOIA.
S. Elizabeth Wilborn

